The Intuitive Basis for Contextualism by Pynn, Geoff
 1 
The Intuitive Basis for Contextualism 
(for The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa) 
 
Geoff Pynn 
FINAL VERSION: September 12, 2016 
 
 
Francois follows climate science closely, and on this basis she believes, correctly, that the earth’s mean 
temperature will continue to rise over the next century. Does she know this? Many would say that she 
does. Her belief is based on her accurate understanding of the scientific consensus, and we typically treat 
scientific expertise as a source of knowledge. On the other hand, you might deny that she knows that the 
temperature will continue to rise, even if you agree that this is likely. After all, climate scientists 
themselves readily acknowledge that their predictions are not entirely certain. So while Francois may be 
justified in her belief, she doesn’t really know. Which answer is right, then? Does Francois know? Or not? 
Contextualists think that which answer is correct depends, in part, on the context in which the question is 
asked. Whether Francois can truly claim to know depends on her context’s “epistemic standard,” which 
determines how strong her epistemic position must be in order for her to count as knowing in that context 
--- how much evidence she needs, which alternatives she needs to be able to rule out, how reliable her 
belief-forming mechanisms need to be, and so on. So according to the contextualist, Francois can truly 
claim to know that the temperature will continue to rise in a context where the epistemic standard is 
relatively relaxed, but not in a context where the epistemic standard is particularly demanding. 
        This chapter outlines the intuitive argument for contextualism. To a substantial degree, my 
presentation follows that of Keith DeRose, who has done more than any other contextualist to develop the 
argument (see especially DeRose 1992, 2005, 2009 (ch.2)). The overall shape of the argument is an 
inference to the best explanation: contextualism, it is claimed, is part of the best explanation for the 
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variability in epistemic standards exhibited by our ordinary knowledge talk. The argument is “intuitive” 
in that it relies upon intuitive judgments about ordinary knowledge claims. The contents of these 
judgments furnish the data that contextualism explains. By calling the judgments “intuitive,” I mean two 
things: first, they are more-or-less non-inferential and cognitively effortless; second, they are generated 
by intellectual reflection or imagination, rather than perception (Nagel 2007, Nado and Johnson 2014). 
When I say that something “intuitively seems” to be the case, I mean that we (I and, hopefully, the reader) 
are inclined to make an intuitive judgment that it is the case. When I say that an intuitive judgment is 
“accepted,” or that we “defer to” an intuition or intuitive judgment, I mean that we accept that the 
judgment’s content is true. 
 
 
Low-High Pairs and The Intuitions They Elicit 
 
The case for contextualism starts with the observation that we apply different epistemic standards in 
different contexts when making and evaluating knowledge claims. This observation will not be news to 
anyone who has been exposed to radical skeptical arguments. When well-constructed and successfully 
deployed, such arguments lead us temporarily to apply much higher epistemic standards than we 
ordinarily do, and hence to conclude that we don’t know much. Still, as Hume pointed out, even skeptics 
regard themselves as knowers once the skeptical spell has been lifted: “[T]he first and most trivial event 
in life will put to flight all their doubts and scruples, and leave them the same, in every point of action and 
speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in 
any philosophical researches” (Hume 1999, 207). One can see the debate over radical skepticism as a 
debate about which epistemic standard is correct: the very high standard introduced by the skeptic, or the 
more manageable one in place once our doubts and scruples have been put to flight. Contextualists claim 
to be able to resolve, or dissolve, this debate: different standards apply in different contexts, so neither 
one is “correct” tout court (see Chapter 10). But the contextualist resolution might appear ad hoc. 
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Couldn’t nearly any philosophical dispute be “resolved” by stipulating that some term at the heart of the 
dispute has a meaning that varies with context? To avoid this charge, we need independent reason to 
accept that contextualism is true. 
        Contextualists argue that shifts in epistemic standards like those triggered by a skeptic’s 
intervention are ubiquitous in ordinary conversations. They present us with pairs of imaginary vignettes to 
illustrate this variability. In the “Low” vignette, a speaker in some mundane situation claims that a subject 
knows some proposition. In the “High” vignette, a speaker in a different situation claims that the same 
subject doesn’t know that same proposition. When the vignettes are well constructed, both the positive 
knowledge claim in the Low case and the negative knowledge claim in the High case seem true.  I'll call 
such cases Low-High pairs. Here is a well-known Low-High pair from Keith DeRose: 
 
Low Bank Case. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the 
bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the 
lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to 
deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be 
deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on 
Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are 
closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on 
Saturday. It’s open until noon.”  
 
High Bank Case. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in [Low Bank 
Case], and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday 
morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and 
discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very 
important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday 
morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of 
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course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, 
“Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as 
confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no, I don’t know. 
I’d better go in and check” (DeRose 1992, 913; DeRose 2009, 1-2). 
 
In Low, it doesn’t matter very much whether Keith is right about the bank's hours, and no hypotheses 
about how he could be wrong has been raised. In High, it matters a lot whether he is right, and a particular 
hypothesis about how he might be wrong (“Banks do change their hours”) has been raised. What leads 
Keith to deny that he knows in High is not an argument for philosophical skepticism, but his awareness of 
the ordinary ways he could go wrong, and the exigencies of everyday life. 
        The intuitive argument for contextualism doesn't rest upon any particular Low-High pair such as 
the bank cases or Stuart Cohen’s equally well-known airport cases (Cohen 1999). Such cases are rather 
meant to illustrate a pervasive variability in our ordinary knowledge talk, which contextualism (it is 
argued) best explains. Nonetheless, it simplifies matters to present the argument as if a particular pair of 
cases were essential to it. There should be no danger in this, provided we bear in mind that the contrast 
between the bank cases is meant to be representative of a ubiquitous phenomenon. So construed, the key 
claim in the case for contextualism is: 
 
Truth. Keith's claim to know in Low and his claim not to know in High are both true.   
 
Truth, in turn, is underwritten by two intuitive judgments.  
First, considered from the perspective of the context in which it was made, each claim seems true. 
As DeRose puts it, contextualists “appeal to how we, competent speakers, intuitively evaluate the truth-
values of particular claims that are made (or are imagined to have been made) in particular situations” 
(DeRose 2009, 49). Imagine yourself in each conversation, and ask whether the claim Keith makes in that 
conversation is true (assuming, of course, that the bank will in fact be open); the contextualist thinks that 
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you’ll find yourself answering, “Yes.”  Second, each claim is intuitively appropriate. A claim can be (and 
seem) true without being (or seeming) appropriate. Asked by a friend who’s run out of gas if there is a 
filling station nearby, I claim that there is one around the corner, without revealing that I know that it has 
been closed for months. My claim is true but misleading, and hence improper. However, the propriety of 
a claim is evidence for its truth, since it is generally improper to make a false claim. Not always: 
hyperbolic and other figurative claims can be proper though false ("It took me a million years to get 
through Husserl's Logical Investigations!"). Nonetheless, such cases are exceptional, and neither of 
Keith’s claims seems at all figurative (pace Hazlett 2007 and Schaffer 2004).  
 It’s important to see that neither of these intuitions constitutes a judgment about what Keith 
knows or doesn't know. For a contextualist, the question of what a subject knows is different from the 
question of what knowledge claims are true of her. To say that Keith knows would be to claim, in effect, 
that he meets the epistemic standards in place in our present context. The case for contextualism does not 
rest on an intuitive judgment that Keith meets or doesn’t meet the epistemic standards in place in the 
context of a philosophical discussion about knowledge or knowledge claims. Rather, it rests on the 
judgment that Keith’s knowledge claims, as made in their imagined contexts, are true. Contextualists 
typically refrain from issuing or endorsing any first-order judgment about whether the characters in their 
vignettes know or don’t know. DeRose, for example, says that his intuitions about the "object-level 
question" of whether the characters in his story know "would be far more wavering and uncertain than are 
my intuitions that the claims made in the cases are true" (DeRose 2009, 49). Similarly, when arguing for 
contextualism using his airport cases, Stewart Cohen is concerned with whether the speakers use the word 
'know' correctly, and whether they speak truly, and not with whether the subject of their knowledge 
attributions knows (Cohen 1999, 58ff.).  
 The intuitions are also not judgments about the sentences that Keith has uttered. Standard 
contextualism does treat both sentences as true with respect to their context of utterance. And 
contextualists are not always careful about distinguishing the truth of a sentence from the truth of a claim 
made by uttering the sentence (though see Stainton 2010 and Pynn 2015). This is partly because 
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contextualists typically presuppose that what Keith claims in each case just is the content encoded by the 
sentence he utters with respect to its context. If a claim's content and truth-value are identified with the 
content and truth-value of the sentence uttered in making the claim, then Truth implies that the sentences 
Keith utters in both cases are true. But the intuitive judgments at play in the argument concern the truth 
and propriety of Keith's claims, and not the sentences he utters in making them.1  
 By and large, contextualists and their opponents have agreed that Keith’s claims are intuitively 
proper and true; controversy has concerned how to accommodate these intuitions, not what they are. 
Recently, however, work in “experimental philosophy” has been used to raise doubts about the intuitions 
themselves. Citing surveys designed to elicit judgments about Low-High pairs, Jonathan Schaffer and 
Joshua Knobe assert that “people simply do not have the intuitions they were purported to have,” 
suggesting that “the whole contextualism debate was founded on a myth” (Schaffer and Knobe 2012, 
675). Chapter 3 discusses this issue in more detail. Two brief responses are worth making. 
        First, some of the data cited by Schaffer and Knobe is neutral with respect to the intuitive 
judgments just canvassed (see DeRose 2011 for discussion). Two of the surveys ask subjects about 
whether various characters in Low-High pairs know, rather than whether speakers who claim to know 
speak truly. A third study (Buckwalter 2010) asked subjects whether the speaker in a Low case who 
claims to know speaks truly, but then, in a departure from contextualist Low-High pairs, asked whether a 
speaker in a High-like case who also claims to know speaks truly. Only the fourth study (Feltz and 
Zarpentine 2010) involved a survey in which the bank cases were presented more-or-less as originally 
constructed. In Feltz and Zarpentine’s study, the average level of agreement that the claims made in High 
and Low were true was around 4 on a 7-point Likert scale. While this result does not confirm the 
contextualist’s claims about the intuitions, neither does it disconfirm them; it is neutral.  
                                                 
1 To see the difference, it may be helpful to focus on the actual sentence that features in the High bank case: "Well, 
no, I don't know." Speaking for myself, I have no intuition whatsoever about whether that sentence is true. I am 
inclined to say that it is neither true nor false, because it is semantically incomplete, since it has no element 
corresponding to what Keith is claiming not to know.  
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        Second, more recent work than that cited by Schaffer and Knobe suggests that the intuition of 
truth in Low and High is, in fact, widely shared. Hansen and Chemla 2013 “confirmed DeRose’s 
prediction that speakers would find both ‘I know that p’ in the Low context and ‘I don’t know that P’ in 
the High context true” (Hansen and Chemla 2013, 203). And Buckwalter 2014 designed a new survey 
where speakers were asked about the truth of knowledge attributions and denials made in various Low 
and High cases, and found that subjects “generally judged everything true across the board” (Buckwalter 
2014, 156).2 In light of this subsequent work, we have reason to doubt Schaffer and Knobe’s assertion 
that contextualism is founded on an intuitive myth. Nonetheless, the empirical adequacy of the standard 
contextualist claim about our intuitive judgments is a subject of lively and ongoing debate; see Chapter 3 
for a more detailed and sympathetic discussion of this line of criticism.  
 
 
Why The Intuitions Should Be Trusted 
 
Deferring to the intuitive judgments gives us strong reason to accept Truth. But why defer to the 
intuitions to begin with? Why think that the seeming truth and propriety of his claims indicates that they 
are proper and true? This question points towards the vast controversy over the role of intuitions in 
philosophy; see Pust 2016 for an introduction to this literature. 
        It is a widely accepted philosophical practice to afford the contents of our intuitive judgments a 
default level of evidential significance. The practice is not to treat intuitive judgments as infallible or 
issuing from some faculty of rational intuition, but simply to treat acceptance of their contents as a 
                                                 
2 Consistent with his earlier study, Buckwalter’s respondents also judged that speakers who claim not to know in 
Low cases and speakers who claim to know in High cases were speaking truly. This wrinkle leads Buckwalter to 
suggest that all of the responses were “largely driven by accommodation;” i.e., the conversational rule -schema 
David Lewis posited to the effect that speakers ought, so far as possible, to assign semantic values to utterances that 
permit them to be interpreted as true (Lewis 1979). Contextualist should welcome Buckwalter’s suggestion. If the 
reason that subjects so readily interpret “know”-involving utterances as true is that they are tacitly adhering to a rule 
of accommodation for such utterances, then we have a further piece of “intuitive” evidence for contextualism: the 
more semantically invariant a term, the more resistant we should be to accommodating a variety of “surface-
contradictory” utterances involving the term.  
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desideratum when tallying the pros and cons of a philosophical view. When the balance of reasons tips in 
favor of a view, despite its conflict with some intuitive judgments, standard practice tells us to "bite the 
bullet" and dismiss the problematic intuitions. Yet even when biting the bullet, we are encouraged to 
provide an explanation for the wayward intuitions. Fairly powerful reasons are required to conclude that 
things are not how they intuitively seem, and we may remain dissatisfied with a bullet-biting view until 
we have been told why things intuitively but wrongly seemed as they did. Employing this standard 
practice in the present context, the intuitions that Keith’s utterances are both proper and true ought to be 
taken at face value. And to take them at face value is to endorse Truth. If we are to reject them, we are 
owed an explanation as to why we had them to begin with. 
       Of course, to describe this practice is not to justify it. Controversy surrounds all general defenses 
of reliance on intuition in philosophy. A more manageable strategy here may be to pursue a narrower 
defense. Jennifer Nagel argues that “epistemic evaluations of particular cases” of the sort frequently 
discussed by epistemologists (e.g., intuitive judgments about Gettier’s cases, Carl Ginet’s fake barn 
country, Lawrence Bonjour’s Truetemp case) are exercises of our capacity to attribute mental states to 
other people (Nagel 2007, 2012). Though our “mindreading” ability is susceptible to error, it is 
nonetheless generally accurate. If Nagel is right about the source of our intuitive epistemic evaluations, 
then we can be confident in treating them as evidentially significant (if defeasible). But Nagel’s defense 
of epistemic intuitions, even if successful, may not establish the significance of the contextualist 
intuitions about Low-High pairs, because the latter may not count as epistemic intuitions; they concern 
the truth and propriety of knowledge claims, and not whether the subjects of those claims know.  
        Since the intuitions concern claims made by uttering sentences, we may wish to treat them as 
linguistic intuitions. Linguists treat the intuitive judgments of competent speakers about certain features 
of their language as an important source of evidence about those features of the language. The standard 
rationale for treating such intuitions as evidence is that linguistic competence relies on tacit knowledge of 
the rules governing the language (Chomsky 1986). On the assumption that a linguistic intuition is the 
product of a speaker's tacit knowledge of the rules governing their language, we have good reason to 
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accept it. While there is substantial controversy over the adequacy of this traditional rationale (see, e.g., 
Devitt 2006), it seems undeniable that competent speakers of a language possess at least some degree of 
epistemic authority concerning many features of their language. If the intuitive judgments of truth and 
propriety in Low-High pairs are linguistic intuitions, then they have a prima facie claim to deference, on 
pain of undermining a principle source of evidence in linguistics. 
        However, just as it is not clear that the intuitions are epistemic, it's also not clear that they are best 
characterized as properly linguistic, either. They don’t concern the properties of words or sentences, but 
the claims made by uttering sentences in particular contexts. The competence required to determine what 
claim is being made by a speaker who utters a particular sentence involves a substantial degree of extra-
linguistic knowledge, as does that required to form an accurate judgment about whether a claim is true or 
conversationally proper. Suppose that Mary utters, “Sharon is by the bank.” Linguistic competence alone 
won’t enable you to know whether she is claiming that Sharon is waiting by a financial institution, or that 
Sharon is down by the riverbank, much less whether Mary’s claim is proper or true. Similarly, tacit 
knowledge of the syntactic and semantic features of the linguistic expressions he uses doesn’t suffice for 
us to know what Keith claims by uttering, “Well, no, I don’t know,” much less to form a judgment as to 
whether his claim is true or proper. Intuitions of truth and propriety rest in part upon empirical knowledge 
of how speakers in various circumstances use particular English sentences, together with our capacity to 
imaginatively occupy the circumstances described in the case. 
            But even if the intuitions do not rest entirely upon tacit linguistic knowledge, their being the 
product of our competence as users of English gives us good reason to treat them with respect. Fluent 
speakers possess practical expertise concerning how to use their language. They are in a position to know 
what sentences speakers tend to utter in various situations, what speakers typically mean to claim by 
uttering what they do, and which claims are appropriate to make under which circumstances. The intuitive 
judgments of competent speakers about the truth and propriety of claims made using their language thus 
deserve deference for the same reason that the judgments of anyone with practical expertise in any 
particular area do: expertise in a practice gives you reliable (though not infallible) intuitions about how 
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the practice works. When a chef who has been making mayonnaise for years tells you that you're adding 
the oil to your emulsion too quickly, you ought to listen. A seasoned jazz musician can tell you, without 
appeal to theory, whether a given note will sound awkward at a particular moment in an improvised 
sequence. Similarly, given sufficient background information, a fluent speaker of English can tell you 




Contextualism and Its Invariantist Rivals  
 
The rest of the intuitive argument for contextualism is devoted to showing that contextualism is better 
able than its rivals to accommodate and explain Truth. Keith's claims are "surface-contradictory". Making 
what is implicit in the uttered sentences explicit, the two claims are: 
 
 (L) I know [that the bank will] be open. 
 (H) I don't know [that the bank will be open]. 
 
Going by their surface grammar, (L) and (H) are contradictories. So how could both claims be true? We 
assume that the bank will be open, and that Keith believes this in both cases. Keith has no evidence 
against the bank's being open in High that he lacks in Low. His epistemic position with respect to the 
                                                 
3 DeRose suggests that correct semantic theory of a term is correct partly in virtue of the fact that we have the 
semantic intuitions about the term that we do, together with other facts about our usage of the term (DeRose 2009, 
66-67). He concludes that ordinary usage facts indicating that a term is context -sensitive are thus “some of the best 
possible type of evidence you could ask for” to conclude that the term is, in fact, context-sensitive. Against this, 
Cappelen and Lepore argue that intuitions of the sort we have been discussing --- intuitions about truth and propriety 
generated by what they call “minimal pairs” --- provide no evidence that a term is semantically context-sensitive 
(Cappelen and Lepore 2005, 17). Their target is specifically the view that the word “know” should be categorized as 
an indexical term. (Indeed, as speech-act pluralists, they agree with contextualists  that the same sentence can be used 
to make claims with different truth-conditions in different contexts.) Though the claim that “know” is an indexical 
term has sometimes been thought to be constitutive of contextualism, contextualists are free reject inde xicalism 
about “know”. See Stainton 2010, Pynn 2016, and chapter 37 for further discussion of these issues. 
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proposition that the bank will be open is the same in both cases. How, then, can he truly claim (L) in Low, 
but truly claim (H) in High? Contextualism provides a simple answer: whether Keith can truly claim to 
know something varies with the epistemic standard in the context in which he makes the claim. Since the 
standard in Low is relatively low, while the standard in High is relatively high, his epistemic position is 
strong enough for him to count as knowing in Low, but not for him to count as knowing in High.  
Invariantists hold that the epistemic standards governing the truth of a knowledge claim are fixed 
across contexts, and so cannot agree that (L) and (H) are both true owing to a variation in the epistemic 
standards across the contexts of utterance. Traditionally, invariantists have attempted to block the 
intuitive inference to Truth by providing alternative explanations for the intuitions that support it. In more 
recent years, clever versions of invariantism have been developed that accept Truth, and propose ways to 
explain it, rather than biting the bullet.  
Traditional invariantists hold that one of Keith's claims is false. Skeptical invariantists hold that 
the standard is very demanding, and hence that Keith's claim to know in Low is false. Moderate 
invariantists hold that the standard is more relaxed, and hence that Keith's claim not to know in High is 
false. In either case, one intuition of truth must go. Invariantists have nonetheless been keen to 
accommodate both intuitions of propriety. This leads to two challenges. The first is to explain how the 
false claim is nonetheless proper. Let's call this the propriety challenge. The second is to explain the 
wayward intuition of truth. Let's call this the truth challenge.  
A common strategy for meeting the propriety challenge focuses on the pragmatic effects of 
knowledge claims (see Chapter 19). False claims can pragmatically convey truths, and in virtue of this 
may be conversationally proper, despite being false. Jessica Brown 2006 offers a pragmatic answer to the 
propriety challenge on behalf of moderate invariantism. If Keith were to claim that he knows in the High 
case, his assertion would, though true, be irrelevant, because the conversationally relevant issue is not 
whether he knows, but whether he is in an especially strong epistemic position. So he falsely claims that 
he doesn’t know, conveying the conversationally relevant truth that he is not in an especially strong 
epistemic position (for other proposals in this vein see Rysiew 2001 and 2007, Black 2005, Hazlett 2007, 
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and Pritchard 2010). Skeptical invariantists have made parallel proposals. Jonathan Schaffer 2004 treats 
ordinary knowledge claims as hyperbole, arguing that such hyperbolic falsehoods convey that the speaker 
can eliminate the possibilities of error relevant in the context of utterance. Wayne Davis 2007 offers a 
different kind of pragmatic skeptical account of the propriety of Low knowledge claims, arguing that they 
are examples of "loose use," proper for the same reason that it can be proper to claim, falsely, that a jar 
with only a few coffee grounds left is empty (see chapter 17).  
Though promising as an answer to the propriety challenge, the pragmatic approach faces a 
significant hurdle in meeting the truth challenge. There are no uncontroversial examples of false claims 
that seem true in virtue of being proper. The central cases of false-but-proper claims --- examples 
involving figurative speech --- do not produce an intuition of truth. And though Davis is surely right that 
it is often proper to call a coffee jar with a couple of beans in it empty, some (the present author included) 
hold that this is in part because such claims are often true: the standards for emptiness fluctuate with 
context. If this is correct, Davis’s proposal treating ordinary knowledge claims as instances of loose use 
may amount to a version of contextualism, rather than a competitor. It is common for invariantists who 
recognize the limitations of the pragmatic approach to the truth challenge to attempt to meet it with an 
error theory of some kind. Timothy Williamson, for example, suggests that repeated exposure to unusual 
skeptical possibilities can produce an “illusion of epistemic danger” (Williamson 2005; see also Vogel 
1990). High context speakers, under the sway of such an illusion, may be led to underestimate the 
strength of their epistemic positions. More recently, Mikkel Gerken 2013 has developed a theory of what 
he calls “epistemic focal bias,” which may produce inaccurate impressions of knowledge and non-
knowledge. There is some tension between the error-theoretic approach to the truth challenge and 
pragmatic resolutions of the propriety challenge. A claim that results from an error may seem proper, but 
once the error is uncovered, we generally change our minds about its propriety. It is not clear that 
invariantists can endorse the intuition of propriety while rejecting the intuition of truth (though see Pynn 
2014 for an attempt to do both). 
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Other invariantists accept Truth. One prominent strategy is to offer a psychological explanation 
for the falsehood of Keith's claim in High. Kent Bach argues that in a High context a speaker's “threshold 
for (confidently) believing” goes up, so that she “demands more evidence than knowledge requires” 
before she is willing to form a confident belief (Bach 2005, 77). Jennifer Nagel (2008, 2010a, 2010b) 
relies on an array of psychological studies to argue that subjects in high stakes situations require more 
information before forming settled beliefs, and so tend to refrain from forming settled beliefs on the basis 
of information that low stakes subjects treat as sufficient for settled belief. Since high stakes decrease a 
subject's “need for closure,” Keith will be less inclined to form a settled belief about the bank’s hours in 
High than he was in Low. The Bach-Nagel strategy is then to say that Keith doesn't have a settled belief 
that the bank will be open in High. Since knowledge requires belief, Keith doesn’t know in High, and his 
claim in High is true (see chapter 7).   
Another invariantist strategy for accommodating Truth is to argue that the epistemic position 
required for knowing varies with the subject's practical situation. Proponents of interest-relative or 
sensitive invariantism say that whether a subject's epistemic position is strong enough to know that P 
depends upon the practical significance for her of the question of whether P is true (see chapter 20). On 
this picture, when the costs of being wrong about P are high, you need to be in a stronger epistemic 
position to know that P than you do when the costs of being wrong are low. Sensitive invariantism 
predicts that (L) and (H) are both true: since the practical stakes are higher for Keith in High than they are 
in Low, a stronger epistemic position is required for him to know in High than in Low. This approach 
rests on a claim known as anti-intellectualism or impurism; namely, that the epistemic requirements for 
knowing vary with the subject’s practical situation. Anti-intellectualism is controversial, though it has 
able defenders, and its capacity to enable invariantists to accommodate our intuitions about Low-High 
pairs is a significant consideration in its favor (see Stanley 2005 and Fantl and McGrath 2009 for major 
defenses of interest-relative invariantism and impurism, respectively; see also Hawthorne 2004). 
Taking one of these approaches enables invariantists to avoid the propriety and truth challenges. 
But the challenges re-emerge when we make a slight alteration to the structure of a Low-High pair. The 
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bank cases involve first-person knowledge ascriptions made in different scenarios. This makes room for 
positing some variation in Keith’s psychological state or practical situation between the Low and High 
scenarios, which explains how (L) and (H) can both be true, even though contextualism is false. But we 
can also construct Low-High pairs where the surface-contradictory claims concern a third party. Such 
“third-person” cases elicit the same intuitive judgments as the original Bank Cases, but there is no room 
to posit a difference in the third-party subject’s mental states or situation to account for the truth of two 
surface-contradictory claims. DeRose’s Thelma and Louise Cases are designed for just this purpose 
(DeRose 2009, 4-5; Cohen 1999's airport cases also have this structure). Thelma, Louise, and Lena are 
co-workers. All three saw their colleague John's hat in the hallway and overheard a conversation whose 
participants presupposed that he was in his office. All three believe that John was in, though they did not 
actually see him: 
 
Low Thelma. On her way home, Thelma stops at the local tavern to collect on a small bet 
concerning whether John would be in that day. After her tavern-mates pay up, they ask her 
whether Lena knows that John was in, since she also had a small bet going on the question. 
"Yes," Thelma answers, “Lena knows that John was in.” 
 
High Louise. Louise is stopped by the police on her way home. They are investigating a serious 
crime, and need to verify whether John was at work today. They have no reason to doubt that he 
was, but need Louise's testimony to be sure. She demurs, pointing out that he may have left his 
hat on the hook the previous day, and that her co-workers who thought he was in may have been 
mistaken. After all, she points out, she didn't actually see him. So while she believes he was in, 
she says, she doesn’t know. They follow up by asking whether Lena could testify to John's 
whereabouts.  No, Louise answers, she didn't see him either: “Lena doesn't know that John was 
in.” 
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Thelma and Louise’s claims about Lena both seem proper and true when considered against the backdrop 
of their contexts of utterance. These intuitions, in turn, underwrite: 
 
Truth*. Thelma's claim that Lena knows in Low and Louise's claim that Lena doesn't know in 
High are both true. 
 
Contextualism accommodates and explains Truth* in precisely the same way it did Truth. But assuming 
that Thelma and Louise are speaking simultaneously, Lena’s confidence level and practical circumstances 
must be the same in each case. So we cannot posit a psychological or practical difference to accommodate 
and explain Truth*. Bach and Nagel both appeal to error theories to handle such third-person cases, 
chalking the intuitive truth of claims like Lena’s up to a kind of error (Bach 2005, 76-77; Nagel 2010b). 
Stanley takes a somewhat different tack, suggesting that in considering whether Lena knows, Louise is 
actually concerned with whether Lena would know if she were in Louise's situation. Since she wouldn't, 
Louise claims that Lena doesn't know; according to Stanley this is "a perfectly intuitive explanation of the 
intuitions" (Stanley 2005, 102). That may be, though to the extent that an explanation's simplicity and 
unity counts in its favor, contextualism is preferable to either of these approaches. 
 
 
Cross-Contextual Intuitions: Trouble for Contextualism? 
 
Insofar as a view's capacity to explain how the contents of our intuitive judgments are true contributes to 
its superiority over rivals, contextualism so far appears superior to invariantism. However, opponents of 
contextualism have argued that some of our intuitions are at odds with contextualism. These problematic 
intuitions primarily concern various forms of disagreement, and cross-contextual assessments (see chapter 
20). For example, imagine the conversation in High Louise continuing: 
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High Louise, Con't. The police point out that Thelma was overheard in the tavern claiming that 
Lena knows that John was in, and ask her what she thinks of that. "No, Thelma's claim was false," 
Louise replies. "Lena doesn't know" (cf. McKenna 2014, 726). 
 
According to contextualism, Thelma's claim was true. Assuming that Louise's assessment of Thelma's 
claim is intuitively correct, we appear to have an intuition whose content contextualists must reject. A 
number of theorists have argued that such assessments furnish intuitive evidence against contextualism 
(e.g. Williamson 2005, 220, Stanley 2005, 52, MacFarlane 2005, 202-203, Brogaard 2008, 411).  
 Note that if this case provides evidence against contextualism, it also provides evidence against 
moderate and sensitive invariantism, at least on the assumption that those views treat Thelma’s claim in 
Low as true. Skeptical invariantists may regard the datum as a point in favor of their own view. However, 
skeptical invariantists already reject many ordinary intuitions of truth; on their view, ordinary positive 
knowledge claims are almost always false, despite our persistent everyday intuitions to the contrary. So 
even granting that the case is an intuitive cost for contextualism as compared to skeptical invariantism, it 
hardly tips the intuitive balance in skeptical invariantism's favor.  
 We may question the degree to which such cases are intuitively problematic for contextualism. 
Prominent Low-High pairs are designed to capture what ordinary speakers would say in relevantly similar 
circumstances. By contrast, it is not clear that an ordinary speaker in circumstances like Louise’s would 
say, "Thelma's claim was false." Provided she were aware of the casual nature of Thelma's tavern 
conversation, it would be at least as natural for her to say, "Thelma was only speaking loosely," or even, 
"She didn't really mean that Lena knows for sure." Neither of these assessments would conflict with 
contextualism; indeed, either of them would provide some indirect confirmation that different standards 
are operative in each context. Of course, Louise could say that Thelma's claim was false, and to the extent 
that such an assessment would be intuitively correct, this is a fair point against contextualism. But if it is 
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not what Thelma most naturally would say, the point is not especially threatening, especially given the 
intuitive costs already borne by invariantism.4 
 Such cross-contextual assessments play an important role in motivating a newer competitor to 
contextualism, known as relativism about knowledge attributions (see chapters 25 and 26). According to 
the relativist, the truth-conditions of a knowledge claim vary not with the context of utterance, but the 
context of assessment (see MacFarlane 2005, MacFarlane 2014 (ch. 8), and Rysiew 2011). Relativists can 
treat Thelma's claim as true relative to her own context of assessment, but false relative to Lena's. So 
relativism can accommodate both the intuitive truth of Thelma's knowledge attribution, and the intuitive 
truth of Lena's assessment of Thelma's knowledge attribution as false. There may be intuitive costs 
associated with relativism as well, however. According to the relativist, Thelma's claim was true as 
assessed in Thelma's context of utterance, but it seems doubtful that Lena would be prepared to grant this. 
Montminy 2009 argues that the relativist must impute to ordinary speakers a kind of semantic error in 
their cross-contextual judgments. But relativism is an important emerging paradigm in philosophical 
semantics, and the question of whether contextualism or relativism better accommodates and explains our 
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